Abstract. In group key exchange (GKE) protocols users usually extract the group key using some auxiliary (ephemeral) secret information generated during the execution. Strong corruptions are attacks by which an adversary can reveal these ephemeral secrets, in addition to the possibly used long-lived keys. Undoubtedly, security impact of strong corruptions is serious, and thus specifying appropriate security requirements and designing secure GKE protocols appears an interesting yet challenging task -the aim of our paper. We start by investigating the current setting of strong corruptions and derive some refinements such as opening attacks that allow to reveal ephemeral secrets of users without their long-lived keys. This allows to consider even stronger attacks against honest, but "opened" users. Further, we define strong security goals for GKE protocols in the presence of such powerful adversaries and propose a 3-round GKE protocol, named TDH1, which remains immune to their attacks under standard cryptographic assumptions. Our security definitions allow adversaries to register users and specify their long-lived keys, thus, in particular capture attacks of malicious insiders for the appropriate security goals such as mutual authentication, key confirmation, contributiveness, key control and key-replication resilience.
Intoduction
A group key exchange (GKE) protocol provides participants with a common secret group key. The main (semantic) security requirement called Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) [8, 9] aims to ensure that the established key is indistinguishable from a random one by any outsider adversary. The second requirement called Mutual Authentication (MA) [8] aims to ensure that all legitimate protocol participants and only them have actually computed identical session group keys. These security requirements have been extensively studied in the literature (see the recent survey in [28] ). In the most basic scenarios, all users are somehow protected, that is, the adversary has no control over them, and is restricted to attacks carried out through the network (which nevertheless include impersonation attacks where the adversary talks on the network by pretending being a legitimate user).
In order to take into account further real-life threats on users, the notion of forward secrecy is usually considered. Forward secrecy means that the established session key remains secure "in the future", that is, remains indistinguishable from random even if the adversary learns used long-lived keys in the future. The notion is motivated by the fact that, by nature, long-lived keys get more chance to be leaked to an attacker than ephemeral secrets.
The next known kind of corruptions, referred to as strong corruptions in [33, 35, 9] provides the adversary with even more information. Namely, the adversary gets the user's ephemeral secrets in addition to the longlived keys. But, he is not allowed to get the established session group key. In [33] , Shoup explains why such a separation makes sense: session keys are typically controlled by higher-level applications that will use them, while internal, ephemeral secrets are specific to the group key exchange protocol execution and could be erased once this protocol is finished. This is a full version of the extended abstract which appeared in: Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS'08), March 18-20, 2008 M. Abe, V. Gligor (Eds.), ACM, pp. 249--260.
Actually, in GKE it seems impossible to obtain secrecy when ephemeral secrets are revealed during the protocol session: if the adversary (even "passively") can learn all intermediate key material, then he will likely be able to compute the final group key. On the other hand, in dynamic groups there are many cases where ephemeral secrets of a particular session are subsequently re-used (in addition to some refreshed data) to update the group key. Then, it is important to ask how the knowledge of ephemeral secrets in a corrupted session impacts the security of other sessions (past and future). This is precisely where the notion of strong forward/backward secrecy raises up.
At this point, we precise the corruption types considered in this paper. First, we consider users that are corrupted and users that are introduced by the adversary. We assume that users are corrupted in a passive mode (rather than active), i.e., the adversary can only "read" secrets held by the attacked user (whatever these secrets are ephemeral or long-lived). Through the knowledge of the long-lived key the adversary can (typically) inject signed messages on behalf of the user while preventing the original user's messages from being delivered. In fact, this allows an active participation of the adversary during the protocol execution, and thus we say the adversary is active; but this refers to his ability to control the network, not the user's behavior. On the other hand, we also wish to capture security threats coming from users that are fully controlled by the adversary. Therefore, we allow the adversary to introduce new users and to register their long-lived keys. The adversary that corrupts or adds users is adaptive (opposed to static) in the sense that it chooses which users to corrupt or to introduce based on the information he gained so far and in any stage of the protocol execution. Second, when considering user corruptions, in order to further refine the security definitions, our intention is to separate the long-lived key from the internal state which contains ephemeral secrets and to specify when the adversary can learn them. Through this separation we explicitly allow the adversary to reveal ephemeral secrets without revealing the long-lived key; we call this opening attacks. They are the balanced complement of weak corruption attacks, where long-lived keys are revealed, but ephemeral secrets are not. We note that under opening attacks, there is hope to prevent the adversary from actively participating in the protocol on behalf of the opened parties since he does not receive the long-lived keys. Finally, we notice that the strong corruption model in its current form is the best (or worst) of two worlds: if the adversary corrupts then it obtains the long-lived keys and the ephemeral data, if it does not corrupt then it obtains nothing. But separating the attacks in two distinct modes allows to refine and opt for stronger security definitions.
Consideration of the adversary that corrupts and introduces users allows us to address security threats against GKE protocols that may arise also in the presence of malicious participants/insiders -corrupted or introduced users whose long-lived keys are known to the adversary. The adversary acting as malicious participants might be able via opening attacks to obtain information from the internal states of the honest users; the goal of the adversary is then to influence their behavior.
The AKE requirement is usually defined from the perspective of some (fresh) session, and thus makes sense only if the adversary is restricted to neither participate on behalf of an user nor to obtain any ephemeral secret in that session, i.e., all during the protocol session active users must be honest and not opened. On the other hand, the MA requirement remains meaningful even without such limitations. Even if achieving MA without AKE is of low interest for key exchange protocols, it is still legitimate to ask whether achieving MA under strong corruptions during the attacked session is possible. This especially, since the MA requirement still makes sense in the presence of malicious participants and may also be useful for protocols other than key exchange. Furthermore, consideration of malicious insiders raises attacks related to key control and contributiveness: for instance, think of a participant who can force the same key to be obtained in two different sessions (e.g. key-replication [26] ). Here we recall that the question on who controls the value of the group key states the important difference between group key exchange and group key transport protocols [12] . In GKE protocols it is essential that the key is computed from inputs (contributions) of all participants such that even a strict subset of participants cannot enforce the final value of the group key. Especially, when considering asynchronous communication and malicious participants who can choose own contributions arbitrarily and may additionally reveal internal states of honest participants at any stage of the protocol execution through opening attacks, preventing key control and ensuring contributiveness for the honest users appears to be a challenging task.
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Related Work
Original Definitions The AKE-and MA-security requirements (without strong corruptions and only for honest users) were originally given by Bresson et al. [11] (see [22, 23, 20] for variants, and [14] for some flaws). In [9] , Bresson et al. modeled strong corruptions, but for AKE-security only, following the ideas of Shoup [33] , and Canetti and Krawczyk [16] for two-party protocols, for which such strong AKE-security has been recently modeled in LaMacchia et al. [27] .
Katz and Shin in 2005 extended the definition of MA-security [21] by assuming misbehaving (malicious) protocol participants; and they provided a concrete generic solution (compiler) to prevent these attacks, however, without considering opening attacks against ephemeral secrets as well as key control and contributiveness. The significance of security against malicious participants was also recognized by Choo et al. [17] through unknownkey share attacks, by which an active adversary tries to make an honest protocol participant believe that the group key is shared with one party when it is in fact shared with another party.
On Key Control and Contributiveness Mitchel et al. [31] (see also Boyd and Mathuria [6] ) gave informal definition of key control, to describe attacks where participants try to influence the resulting value of the key. Yet informally, Ateniese et al. [2] proposed the notion of contributiveness meaning that all participants must equally contribute to the computation of the key and guarantee its freshness (see [35] ); these definitions emphasize the difference between key distribution and key exchange [30] . Following these requirements Bresson and Catalano [7] have considered the (weaker) case where participants are honest but have biased source of randomness so that an adversary can possibly gain extra information about the key. Deepening this, Bohli et al. [4] gave definitions of key control and contributiveness considering a (stronger) case where participants deliberately wish to influence the resulting value of the group key. Still, their definitions are based on the model from [11] , and, thus, do not consider strong corruptions. Finally, Krawczyk mentioned in [26] that a key exchange protocol should prevent key-replication attacks whose goal is to influence the acceptance of the same key in different protocol sessions.
Other Work Close to Ours Independent of our work, Desmedt et al. [19] considered a property of nonmalleability for GKE protocols, which is close to key control and contributiveness. Their security goal, called shielded-insider privacy, aims to prevent attacks where an outsider adversary upon communication with some malicious participants prior to the protocol execution, obtains information about the later computed group key. In order to ensure shielded-insider privacy they use Pedersen's commitments [32] ; however in case of strong corruptions committed secrets can still be revealed to the adversary (due to opening attacks), so that malicious participants would still be able to bias the computation. In our model we do not consider this scenario explicitly, but focus on the (in)ability of the adversary representing malicious participants to predict the resulting value of the later established group key. Recently, Manulis [28] analyzed several existing models for GKE protocols with respect to considering strong corruptions: he pointed out that security against strong corruptions is currently considered in a rather restrictive way: only for strong forward secrecy of AKE-security. Moreover, none of the available game-based security models is complete enough to unify the most important definitions of AKE-, MA-security, and key control and contributiveness.
Contributions and Organization
We solve most of the problems put in light above by revisiting the GKE security model from the perspective of strong corruptions and key registration attacks. Further, we design a provably secure GKE protocol that resists these attacks. Security Model and Stronger Definitions As our first contribution in Section 2 we provide the following:
-we model a powerful adversary who is given access to strong corruptions, by describing an appropriate game-based security model for GKE protocols, thus significantly extending the ideas from Bresson et al. [9] ;
-we formalize strong AKE-security by considering opening attacks that may occur in earlier and later protocol sessions; -in our definition of strong MA-security we consider the adversary that acts as malicious participants during the attacked session and opens all other (honest) users; due to the opening attacks our definition is stronger than the related one from [21] . -we formalize strong contributiveness as security against attacks that enforce any value chosen by the adversary as a group key (this includes key-replication [26] ); since the adversary can act as malicious participants and open all other (honest) participants our requirement is stronger compared to [4] ; -we strengthen the GKE security model by allowing the adversary to introduce users and register their longlived keys; this is similar to the recent models in 2-party key exchange [27, 29] and is the main difference to the extended abstract of this paper which appeared in [13] and also to many previous GKE security models.
GKE Protocol with Strong Security
As a second contribution in Section 3, we describe a 3-round GKE protocol, named TDH1, and prove that it provides strong versions of AKE-, MA-security and contributiveness, while the deployed techniques can be seen as general for many GKE protocols. TDH1 tolerates the following numbers of malicious insiders (out of n participants in total): for MA-security up to n − 2, for contributiveness up to n − 1, whereby all remaining honest users might be opened! Our security proofs do not rely on the Random Oracle Model [3] . The AKE-security of TDH1 is based on the Tree Decisional Diffie-Hellman (TDDH) assumption, introduced by Kim et al. in [24, 25] . We give a formal definition of the underlying TDDH problem and show its polynomial equivalence to the standard Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [5] by a proof which addresses arbitrary full binary trees, i.e., trees where each node has exactly zero or two leaves (note, Kim et al. addressed only a subset, i.e., linear and complete trees).
Strong Security Definitions for GKE
We start by (re)stating existing definitions and classical notations using the game-based approach. Note that another way (which we do not consider here) to define security requirements is to use the simulation-based approach, e.g. [21] (but see Remark 1).
Protocol Execution and Participants
Users, Instance Oracles, Long-Lived Keys Let U be a set of at most N users. A protocol is said to be correct if, when no adversary is present, all participants compute the same key. Note that our definition is independent of the communication channel, e.g., (asymmetric) broadcast, multicast, or unicast.
Strong Adversarial Model
Now we consider an adversary A which is a Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT) algorithm having complete control over the network. As described in the following, A can add users to the set U and interact with protocol participants via queries to their oracles. Note that our security model (similar to [9, 21, 4] ) does not deal with the issues of denial-of-service and fault-tolerance; our security definitions aim to prevent honest participants from accepting the group key biased by malicious insiders.
AddUser(U, Λ): if U ∈ U then U with the long-lived (public) key contained in Λ is added to U ; Λ may also contain some further information. Execute(S): A eavesdrops an honest execution of P.Setup between a chosen set of oracles and is given the resulting transcript of P.Setup(S). Send(Π The adversary has two ways of learning LL U : by asking it -Corrupt(U ), or by registering it -AddUser(U, Λ). For simplicity, in all definitions of security unless otherwise stated, we treat U as corrupted if any of these queries had occurred.
Remark 1.
The separation of the queries RevealState and Corrupt/AddUser explicitly provides the possibility for the opening attacks mentioned in the introduction. By asking the RevealState query to an instance oracle Π s U the adversary reads out its internal state but cannot impersonate honest U in the protocol execution, unless a Corrupt(U ) query is asked (in which case all instance oracles Π s U become malicious insiders through possible impersonation actions of A). Thus, just opening a user does not make him malicious. In contrast, simulation-based security models (e.g. Universal Composability / Reactive Simulatability) handle strong corruptions typically as follows: upon corrupting a user the adversary learns all information known to that user and controls him thereafter. Obviously, in the simulation-based models opening attacks (which strengthen the adversary) are currently not modeled.
Strong AKE-Security
In case of strong AKE-security one must also consider the knowledge of the adversary about long-lived keys and ephemeral secrets of session participants. If the adversary obtains a long-lived key before the session is started then it can impersonate a user, and thus, learn the session key. And if the adversary is allowed to obtain long-lived keys before the session is finished then it should be restricted from actively using these keys during that time [22] .
On the other hand, the adversary should be allowed to reveal ephemeral secrets of participants before the session starts 3 and after the session is finished (defined as strong forward and weak backward secrecy in [14] ). Note that, if one allows long-lived key corruptions in later sessions, revealing ephemeral secrets during the attacked session wouldn't make sense. In order to model the described requirements for the adversarial knowledge we define the notion of oracle freshness, extending those given in [9, 22] by the conditions concerning key registration and opening attacks. We note that the above definition ensures that if at least one oracle participating in a session is fresh then the whole session is fresh too because freshness of one oracle requires freshness of all its partners. This notion of oracle freshness simplifies the following definition of strong AKE-security for GKE protocols. 
and denote with Adv ake P (κ) the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries A. We say that a GKE protocol P provides strong AKE-security if this advantage is negligible.
We again stress that (strong) AKE-security makes sense for adversaries that are not able to corrupt users and act on their behalf during the attacked session or reveal any ephemeral secrets used in that session -this is guaranteed by the freshness property.
Strong MA-Security
We say that Π s U is a malicious participant/insider if the adversary has previously asked Corrupt(U ) or AddUser(U, Λ). In all other cases Π s U is honest. The following definition of MA-security unifies the requirements of mutual authentication, key confirmation, and unknown-key share resilience. It considers malicious participants and allows opening attacks against all honest users at any protocol stage. 
The maximum probability of this event is denoted Suc ma P (κ); we say that a GKE protocol P provides strong MA-security if this probability is negligible.
Strong Contributiveness
The following definition models attacks related to key control, contributiveness and unpredictability of group keys in the presence of malicious participants. Informally, we consider an active adversary A that can add, corrupt and open participants at any stage of the protocol execution in such a way that there exists at least one honest oracle (which may nevertheless be opened!) that accepts the session group key chosen by the adversary. This subsumes key-replication attacks [26] by which honest users are forced to accept a group key from another session. Note also that U must be honest but A is allowed to reveal the internal state of Π s U during the execution of the attack stage (this is because our model separates LL U from state s U ). The goal of the adversary is to influence the honest participants to accept the chosen key. Our game appears stronger than [4] since the adversary can open honest users' internal state (furthermore he can make corruptions in an adaptive manner).
Remark 2.
The main difference to the non-malleability definition from [19] is that we allow A to open honest users during the attacked session, however, at the cost that we do not deal with the ability of A to bias the probability distribution of the resulting group key (similar to [4] ). It seems to be hard to achieve this goal if A corrupts n − 1 users and opens the last n-th honest user, which is allowed by our definition. At least, the commitment techniques used in [19] would not help since committed secrets that become part of the internal state can be revealed.
TDH1 Protocol with Strong Security
In this section we present our constant-round GKE protocol denoted TDH1 and show that it satisfies the strong versions of AKE-, MA-security, and contributiveness. Its AKE-security relies on the Tree Decisional DiffieHellman (TDDH) assumption, introduced by Kim et al. in [24, 25] .
Number-Theoretic Assumptions
First, we formally specify the TDDH assumption and quantify the reduction to the classical Decisional DiffieHellman (DDH) assumption [5] . Our protocol and those (unauthenticated) in [24, 25] require a special multiplicative group G in which DDH is assumed to be hard and for which there exists an efficient bijection 5 from G to Z |G| . Thus, not every DDH-hard group can be used, e.g., no such bijection is known for elliptic curves.
Algebraic Group Let p be a safe prime, i.e., p = 2q + 1, with q a κ-bit prime. The set of quadratic residue modulo p is a cyclic groupĜ of order q; let g be a generator:Ĝ = g . Consider the following mapping
It can be shown [25] that the function f : x → u(g x ) from Z q to G is a bijection, and that the operation (a, b) ∈ G 2 → u(ab mod p) is a group law on G. Since G = Z q (as sets), we can define the exponentiation a b := u(a b mod p) for all a, b ∈ G. Also, due to the fact that f is a bijection, we have f (x) is random, uniform in G as soon as x is so.
Finally, it is believed [5] that the DDH assumption holds in G, that is, the distributions of (g x1 , g x2 , g x1x2 ) and (g x1 , g x2 , g r ) are computationally indistinguishable for x 1 , x 2 , r ∈ R G.
Tree Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption Let T n be the set of all full 6 binary trees with n leaves. For a T n ∈ T n of depth d T n , each node is identified via a label l, v , where l ∈ [0, d T n ] is the level of the node and v its position within this level: the position is such that the child nodes of l, v (if present) are labeled l + 1, 2v and l + 1, 2v + 1 (this implies that the nodes positions are in [0, 2 l − 1], but may be not contiguous). The root node is labeled 0, 0 . In the following we will denote T n \ 0, 0 by T * n . The set of leaf nodes and the set of internal nodes of T n are defined as (respectively):
For a set X of n randomly chosen variables x l,v ∈ R G, with l, v ∈ LN Tn , we (recursively) define for each l, v ∈ IN T n :
, and
The exponentiation x → g x is a bijection from Z |G| to G. We require that there exists an efficiently computable (bijective) mapping in the opposite direction, but we do NOT require this mapping to be the discrete logarithm! 6 A binary tree is called full if each of its nodes has exactly 0 or 2 children. Sometimes such trees are also called proper.
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Additionally, for a randomly chosen r ∈ R G, we define the tuples TDDH Tn (X) and TDDH $ T n (X) as follows:
The TDDH assumption states that the respective distributions of these tuples induced by uniform choices of r and the x l,v , for l, v ∈ LN T n are computationally indistinguishable.
Definition 6. (TDDH Assumption)
For all n > 1, any T n ∈ T n , any group G, and any PPT algorithm A, the distinguishing advantage Adv TDDH T n ,G (A), defined as follows, is negligible (in κ = log |G|):
Theorem 1 (DDH ⇐⇒ TDDH). The TDDH problem in G is polynomially equivalent to the DDH problem in Z q , and we have:
Adv
. The proof appears in Appendix A and is more general than those in [24, 25] that focus only on complete and linear binary trees. For n = 2 we get the classical DDH assumption in G with the advantage Adv
Light Description of TDH1
The main mechanism of the protocol is that of [24, 25] , so we first recall it. The differences will be in message authentication, key derivation, and applied erasure technique to prevent the ephemeral session secrets from being leaked once the session is finished. Erasure of the internal state can be seen as a general method to achieve AKE-security in the presence of opening attacks for static GKE protocols.
The Setup Operation Every oracle is assigned to a leaf node of a so-called linear binary tree T n : a full binary tree with one leaf at each level, except for the deepest one with two leaves (see Figure 1) . In other words Upon receivingŶ , all other oracles Π i =1 are able to compute their own set X i consisting of all secret values x l,v in their paths up to the root. Hence, every oracle finally learns x 0,0 . We emphasize that x 0,0 is never exposed, and that there is no y 0,0 in the protocol (see description of function TDH1_Exp (l, X) below).
Group Key Confirmation and Derivation
To derive the session group key K, each participant iteratively computes a sequence of values ρ 0 , . . . , ρ n using a pseudo-random function (PRF) f with a public value v 0 as input. The key (secret seed) of f is initially set to x 0,0 , and is changed in each invocation of f by embedding successive nonces using an appropriate one-way permutation π. These nonces are provided by participants during the protocol execution.
Intuitively, these successive evaluations of f and π prevent malicious participants from influencing values of the PRF keys and ensures contributiveness for the intermediate value ρ n , which is then used as a seed for f to derive the key confirmation token µ (on input a constant public value v 1 ) and the actual session group key K (on input another constant public value v 2 = v 1 ). Prior to accepting K: (i) participants exchange and verify signatures on µ to ensure MA-security (similar to [21] ) and (ii) erase [18] all ephemeral secrets, used to obtain K from their internal states, to achieve strong AKE-security. Fig. 1 . Example of a Linear Binary Tree T 3 for the Group G = {Π 1 , Π 2 , Π 3 }.
Detailed Description of TDH1
Preliminary Notations We assume that long-lived keys LL i = (sk i , pk i ) are generated via Σ.Gen(1 κ ), where Σ = (Gen, Sign, Verify) is an existentially unforgeable (under chosen message attacks) digital signature scheme. We define the following key exchange functions: The Protocol TDH1.Setup In the following we assume that an oracle aborts without accepting if any performed check fails. Round 1. Given the tree structure T n , each oracle Π i proceeds as follows:
Sign to obtain a signature σ i on 0|y l i ,v i |r i |pid i using the private key sk i ; -Broadcast U i |0|y li,vi |r i |σ i . In addition, Π 1 does the following:
Sign to obtain a signature σ 1 on 1|Ŷ |sid 1 |pid 1 using the private key sk 1 ; -Broadcast U 1 |1|Ŷ |σ 1 . 
Broadcast round: Every Π i broadcasts Ui|2|σ i 
Then every oracle (including Π 1 ) does the following: -Compute both K i and µ i using TDH1_Con(x 0,0 , sid i ); [note that x 0,0 ∈ X i ] -Erase any private information from state i (including all x l,v , and ρ 0 , . . . , ρ n ) except for K i ; -Invoke Σ.Sign to obtain a signature σ i on 2|µ i |sid i |pid i using the private key sk i ; -Broadcast U i |2|σ i .
Group Key Computation. When Π i receives U j |2|σ j from all other oracles, it proceeds as follows:
-Erase any private information from state i (including K i ), and accept with K i . 
, and K = ρ 3 := f ρ 2 ⊕π(r 2 ) (v 0 ), and the key confirmation token µ := f K (v 1 ). Note that the value x 0,0 is never sent over the public channel but computed locally by all participants upon receiving enough information. Furthermore, there exists no y 0,0 in the protocol.
Security and Performance of TDH1
In our security proofs following the specification of our model we consider that ephemeral secret information kept in state U is always independent of the long-lived key sk U . That is, in each session, state U contains X U consisting of all secrets x l,v known to Π U , ρ 0 , . . . , ρ n and possibly some (implementation specific) temporary variables used to compute these values. Furthermore, we assume that the signing algorithm Σ.Sign which implicitly uses sk U is executed under the same protection mechanism as sk U , e.g., in a smart card as in [9] (although smart cards have limited resources we observe that in TDH1.Setup each oracle has to generate at most three signatures). This is important since the signing algorithm may generate some randomness which should also be protected from being revealed via a RevealState query; otherwise the adversary may be able to obtain some information about sk U .
The following theorems show that TDH1 satisfies the requirements of strong AKE-, MA-security and contributiveness; the last two also under consideration of insider attacks. In all theorems q s is the total number of executed protocol sessions during the corresponding attack game.
Theorem 2 (Strong AKE-Security of TDH1). If Σ is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks,
F is pseudo-random, and G is TDDH-hard then TDH1 provides strong AKE-security, and
Proof. (Sketch) We define a sequence of games G i , i = 0, . . . , 7 with the adversary A against the AKE-security of TDH1. In each game we denote Win ake i the event that the bit b output by A is identical to the randomly chosen bit b in game G i .
Game G 0 . This game is the real game Game
A,TDH1 (κ) where we use a simulator ∆ to maintain set U, simulate the execution of the protocol (on behalf of uncorrupted users), and answer all queries of A.
Game G 1 . This game is identical to Game G 0 with the only exception that ∆ fails and bit b is set at random if A asks a Send query on some U i |seqn|m|σ, with seqn ∈ {0, 1, 2} and σ a valid signature on m, that has not been previously output by an oracle Π s i before querying Corrupt(U i ) (note that Corrupt queries can be generally asked after the Test query) or AddUser(U i , Λ).
In other words the simulation fails if A outputs a successful forgery; such event is denoted Forge. A classical reductionist argument (see for instance [11] ) shows that in that case we can build a forger against the signature scheme and upper-bound the probability difference between G 1 and G 0 by N Suc euf−cma Σ (κ). Game G 2 . This game is identical to Game G 1 except that ∆ fails if two instances of an honest user used the same nonce twice. Since there are N users and at most q s sessions the difference between games can be upper-bounded by (N q 
This implies,
Pr[Win
Game G 4 . This game is identical to Game G 3 except that ∆ is given a tuple from the real TDDH T N distribution (as specified in Section 3.1) where T N is a linear tree. In all sessions except the q * s -th one, ∆ simulates the honest participants as specified by the protocol. In the q * s -th session with n participants ∆ injects public values g x l,v from TDDH T N into the protocol execution. Note that in the q * s -th session the group size n might be smaller than N , thus the simulator will use the subtree T n which is composed of T N 's nodes from level 0 to level n − 1.
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The idea is to assign Π s 1 to the (internal) node n − 1, 0 , Π s 2 to the leaf node n − 1, 1 , . . ., Π s n to the leaf node 1, 1 , and to use for each node l, v ∈ T n \ 0, 0 public values g x l,v taken from the given TDDH T N distribution. The secret value x 0,0 used for the key confirmation is also taken from this distribution. Since the q * s -th session is fresh, no RevealState queries to Π s i or to any of its partners have been asked (∆ would not be able to answer them since it does not know the secret values x l,v of internal and leaf nodes). Of course in all other sessions RevealState queries can be easily answered. Since TDDH T N is a real distribution we conclude that this game is a "bridging step" (as named in [34] ) and Pr[Win . Game G 5 . This game is identical to Game G 4 except that ∆ is given a tuple from the random TDDH $ T N distribution. Thus, for honest players, the secret x 0,0 is simulated using the provided random element g r .
Obviously, | Pr[Win
This game is identical to Game G 5 except that in the q * s -th session ∆ replaces f by a truly random function, implying the uniform distribution of K = ρ n . Considering n ≤ N we obtain by a "hybrid argument"
7 | Pr[Win
. This is the continuation of the hybrid argument, but for clarity we specify a separate game; the confirmation token µ and the session key K are replaced by two random κ-bit values, s.t., | Pr[Win 
However the validity of signatures on tokens µ i and µ j implies that µ i = µ j . Thus the probability difference between these games is upper-bounded by q s Pr[K
Combining the previous equations we get the desired result.
Theorem 4 (Strong Contributiveness of TDH1). If F is collision-resistant pseudo-random and π is one-way then TDH1 provides strong contributiveness, and
Note that in TDH1 the adversary is able to enforce the resulting value for x 0,0 by opening oracles of honest users during the protocol execution. More precisely, A can enforce that the same x 0,0 is computed In our proof of Theorem 4 we show that despite of being able to enforce x 0,0 the adversary is still unable to enforce the resulting session group key K. We make use of the following "difference lemma". prior to the acceptance of K so that each ρ l , l ∈ [1, n] depends on the previously computed ρ l−1 . We consider the probability that for an honest Π s i * the adversary A is able to enforce any of the values ρ i * , . . . , ρ n (note that K = ρ n ), or K computed by the collision-resistant pseudo-random function f. This is equivalent to the event that in the prepare stage A is able to output any ρ i * , . . . , ρ n , or K which Π s i * computes in any session of the attack stage. On the other hand, applying Lemma 1 in our proof we do also consider the upper-bound for the success probability of the adversary in case that its strategy differs from influencing any value in ρ i * , . . . , ρ n . Comparison of Security and Performance of TDH1 and other Static GKE Protocols In Table 1 we compare TDH1 protocol with several well-known provably secure GKE protocols in terms of their performance and achieved security goals. Our comparison is done based on the security arguments and adversarial settings given in the original publications (sometimes transformed to the terminology of our model). In general, "weak" (or "strong") denotes consideration of weak (or strong) corruptions for each of the security requirements, whereas "honest" (or "malicious") denotes the assumption on the type of the protocol participants. Note again that by strong corruptions we mean not only adaptive attacks revealing the long-lived key (thus, weak corruptions) but also opening attacks which read out the ephemeral secrets. We also distinguish whether a protocol has been proven under standard or non-standard assumptions such as Ideal Cipher Model (ICM) or Random Oracle Model (ROM). We remark that TDH1 is the only protocol which provably satisfies strong versions of AKE-, MA-security and contributiveness (under consideration of malicious insiders where appropriate, that is for MA and contributiveness) while being proven in the standard model. The protocol proposed by Desmedt et al. [19] has similar properties as TDH1 but deals only with weak corruptions (ephemeral secrets never leak). The work by Katz and Shin 10 [21] can also be seen as close to ours since they provide MA-security against malicious insiders; the main differences are that their model (although considering strong corruptions) does not allow separate opening attacks, i.e., the scenario in which the adversary learns the ephemeral secrets of other honest users is not considered, and it also does not allow the adversary to register long-lived keys of the users under its control.
Proof (of Theorem 4). (Sketch) Assume that an adversary
Last but not least, we note that the overall efficiency of TDH1 is similar to the most efficient currently known provably secure GKE protocols (in the standard model).
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have addressed security of GKE protocols against strong (adaptive) corruptions which reveal internal states (incl. ephemeral secrets) of participants and proposed appropriate definitions of strong AKE-, MA-security, and contributiveness. Additionally, we presented a 3-round GKE protocol TDH1 which satisfies strong security under standard cryptographic assumptions.
The function TDH1_Con(x 0,0 , r 1 | . . . |r n ) is of independent interest and can be seen as an add-on compiler for our definition of contributiveness if x 0,0 is the common ephemeral secret computed in the underlying GKE protocol (see [12] for details).
The equivalence between the TDDH and DDH assumptions is also of independent interest since it is valuable for the construction of other cryptographic schemes with provable security in the standard model. An interesting open question: Is TDDH randomly self-reducible?
Beside the extension of TDH1 towards dynamic groups, future work in the area of GKE security may address:
-Consideration of strong corruptions in combination with fault-tolerance and security against DoS attacks discussed in [15] and [19] , -Strengthening of the simulation-based security models for GKE protocols (e.g. [21] ) towards opening attacks due to our Remark 1.
